Basis for Recommendation
Although IÉ-RU had considered the route characteristics and risks from an individual drivers’ perspective. IÉ-IM had not, at the time of the incident, assessed and collated the operational risk profile of individual signals and junctions along the route from a system perspective. Such an assessment could inform future changes which may be relevant to future changes such as timetable change and infrastructure enhancements (e.g. line speed increases).
Recommendation
IÉ-IM should identify and assess, through proportionate risk assessments undertaken in accordance with the relevant requirements of IÉ-IM’s Safety Management System (SMS), the operational risks associated with SPADs at individual junctions.
IÉ-IM should implement risk control measures where required, including interim measures where train protection is not yet provided, and demonstrate that the associated safety risks have been reduced to a level that is as low as is reasonably practicable and conform with the risk acceptance criteria set out in IÉ-IM’s SMS.