

PART 1 – Occurrence Description

Time & Date	31/01/2025 between 06:45 hours (hrs) and 09:30 hrs
Organisation	Iarnród Éireann Railway Undertaking (IÉ-RU) & IÉ-Infrastructure Manager (IÉ-IM)
Location	Navan Road Parkway
Parties	<p>Other parties involved, directly and indirectly, were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Passengers alighting onto Platform 2, many were secondary school students; • Patrol Driver – Private contractor personnel engaged to open and close and patrol unmanned stations; • Transport for Ireland (TFI) – Reported the incident to IÉ; • Lift Operators – Private contractor personnel located in the security room at Howth Junction Control Centre (HJCC) who operate the lifts.
Incident Synopsis	<p>During the opening of the Navan Road Parkway Station, the platform access gate onto/from Platform 2 to the concourse was closed and locked, preventing passengers leaving Platform 2.</p> <p>Five trains arrived at Navan Road Parkway Station, with numerous secondary school students, alighting, from trains, onto Platform 2.</p> <p>With no other means to leave or access Platform 2, at least thirty-three persons (nine separate instances) subsequently crossed the running lines to access Platform 1 and exit the station.</p>
Scope of SAN	The scope of the SAN is in relation to: Station access and egress; means of assistance for passengers; lift operations; station monitoring; and what means are present to discourage passengers accessing the line.
Definitions	Trespasser – Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 define a trespasser as a “person present on railway premises where such presence is forbidden”. However, where conditions have been created by the railway organisation (e.g. locked gates resulting in passengers trapped), the actions by the persons are deemed to be a mistake i.e. the persons who accessed the line during this incident are not deemed to be trespassers.

PART 2 – Evidence

2.1 – Evidence reviewed

Evidence included: CCTV of the accident, site photographs, statements, draft control room procedures, human factors review of lift call operations signage and buttons, human factors review of the HJCC operations, wayfinding guidance documents, number of instances where stations were locked with passengers locked in/ out, work instructions for the patrol drivers.

Evidence 2.2 – Station Infrastructure

General Description

Navan Road Parkway is a two platform station with access to Platform 2 only available from the combined concourse and bridge via staircase and lift (see Figure 1). Platform 1 is also accessed via the same route, but has an additional access gate provided with a “burst through” mechanism which gives access to the Royal Canal towpath.




Figure 1 – Navan Road Parkway Station

Access/ Egress – Lifts

The lifts at Navan Road Parkway use the “Lift Call Operation” system and operate only after a Lift Operator has granted a request by a passenger through the intercom. The instructions on the panel read: To use the lift. 1. Press intercom button 2. Speak to operator 3. Press lift button 4. Enter lift (see Figure 2).



Figure 2 – Lift call intercom and signage

It should be noted that the lifts at DART Stations have reverted to the conventional one-step system. The remaining lifts, nationwide, use the “Lift Call Operation” system (the system was initially introduced to minimise damage caused to lifts due to vandalism).

The lift call operation is further discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.5.

Access/ Egress – Stairs

A full height security gates preventing access to the concourse is located on each platform stairwell (see Figure 3). There is no signage on this gate.



Figure 3 – Gate on stairway



Figure 4 – Help point

Help Points

There are two help points located on each of the platforms. The help points have both information and emergency buttons and associated signage (i and SOS (Figure 4)) fixed to a square pole and is facing towards the track, there is no signage on the sides of the pole.

The absence of additional signage on the sides makes the help points inconspicuous from the lift and stair locations i.e. the passengers need to be standing in front and close to the signage to see it.

Platform Ramps

There are platform ramps at the ends of each platform to facilitate access onto the railway for IÉ track workers. The ramps are not gated and there are no anti-trespass mats (also informally known as witches' hats) present.

At the time of the incident, a risk assessment had not been carried out in relation to the installation of anti-trespass at Navan Road Parkway, although noting that there are, on average two known trespass incidents, at this location, annually. Therefore, Navan Road Parkway was not considered a trespassing “hot spot”, therefore a risk assessment was not considered to be required.

The signage present at the ramps are the “rabhadh”, “warning” signs, which state “Do not trespass on the railway” (see Figure 5).



Figure 5 – Platform ramps and associated signage

Other signage at the Station

The wayfinding signage is appropriate for the station.

In relation to other signage, at the time of the accident, there was a sign present in the window of the ticket kiosk which stated “Customer Information Navan Road Parkway In case of emergency please telephone 090 649 7723 for assistance”, see Figure 6.

The RAIU phoned this number several times, with no answer. IÉ could not determine, post incident, whether anyone phoned this number on the day of the incident. There are no other numbers displayed at the station.

IÉ have taken measures against this finding, see Section 4.1.



Figure 6 – Kiosk signage

2.3 – Safe Operating Procedure (SOP) Lift Call System – Security Room HJCC

The SOP for the lift-call system outlines the required operating procedures essential to the correct application and control of the lift call system. The document is primarily a guide as to how to operate the system, with limited information in relation to how the lift operators should communicate with the customers.

The lift call system at HJCC provides the following level of communication and information at the lift operator’s terminal: visual (external and internal lift cameras), audio (two-way communication between the lift operator and customer); grant access virtual button (on screen toggle on function that permits access to the lift for the customer).

Section 7.1, Customer/Contactor/IÉ Colleagues – Permitted Access, outlines the procedure for the operation and granting of access to customers, requiring lift operators to apply their training in granting lift access to IÉ customers through the lift call audio and visual interface in a timely and courteous manner.

Section 9.3, Anti-Social/Criminal Behaviour, states that all occurrences of anti-social or criminal behaviour, e.g. vandalism, must be reported to the Supervisor/Acting Supervisor who must arrange for An Garda Síochána and/or contractor security personnel (if available for that location) to attend the location and deal with the situation.

There is no other information in relation to how the lift operators communicate with customers.

2.4 – Customer Experience (CX) Department

It should be noted that IÉ's Customer Experience (CX) department strategies include a goal "to ensuring that every part of our customer's journey is the very best it can be, which is why we are focusing on service and, ensuring that our customers have the best possible journey that they can, every time they travel".

Part of the CX Department's vision was to have dedicated teams now responsible for customer experience in stations and on trains, ensuring customers remain very much at the heart of IÉ's business.

In May 2023, the CX department commenced the "roll out of a comprehensive CX training programme which targets every colleague within the organisation, giving them best in class training, highlighting that each and every one of us, irrespective of the role we perform has an impact on customer experience".

The lift operators did not receive the CX training, despite being required to communicate with customers.

2.5 – Human Factors, Lift Operator Centre Preliminary Report

In 2021, the IÉ Human Factors Department conducted a review of the lift call operation, Lift Operator Centre Preliminary Report (Version 1.0 issued on the 27/07/2021), related on the operations located in HJCC (there is also operations out of Mallow). The report outlines the initial findings including commentary/notes from correspondence with supervisors and site visits to the lift operator centre at HJCC. The purpose of the visits was to gain an understanding of the daily activities carried out by lift operators and identify any potential issues which may be affecting the workload of the lift operators. The report made a number of preliminary findings, outlined below are those relevant to the investigation.

Two-Step versus One-Step Process

In terms of the two-step process, in that the user must first select the intercom button (first step) followed by the lift button (second step), once approval has been granted by the lift operator, the site visits found that some of the calls were long as a result of the user being unable to understand the second step of the process i.e. to press a separate button once again after speaking to the lift operator. Examples of this misunderstanding ranged from users being unable to find the lift button, re-pressing the intercom button, pressing the camera, pressing the speaker, or taking no further action after speaking to the lift operator.

The report found that, for users with hearing impairment and without hearing aids, the current two-step process impedes their use as they cannot receive any instruction by the lift operator.

The report concluded that a transition to a one-step process where the lift operator can summon/release the lift to the user after they have pressed the button once, and a successful assessment of the user has taken place would reduce the time taken to complete each call, reduce the workload of the lift operator, and improve usability for the end users. A one-step process would also allow those with hearing impairment call the lift without any requirement for the user to hear any further instruction from the lift operator in normal circumstances.

Communications between lift operators and users

Lift operators deal with security issues through use of the intercom speaker to request individuals to stop their activity and/or leave the vicinity. They also are using the CCTV system to identify security issues and then alert the mobile security team by phone.

The site visit found that lift operators were not aware of any procedure or script to follow to deal with anti-social behaviour and/or unwanted users. They appeared to be using their own techniques to deal with the matter. One technique observed by the human factors department was answering the call and not speaking to the individual as choosing to reject the call would result in an audible alert to the passenger that their call had been terminated and may antagonise the situation.

There are no set criteria for the acceptance or denial of a person or group of persons to use the lift. This decision is based solely on the lift operator's personal judgment. It should be noted that as a result, different lift operators can make different decisions about the same user.

No known procedure is in place for users with impaired hearing. If there is a procedure for such users, this was not known by operators on duty.

At the time, the planned "next steps" were to:

- Understand the plans for further rollout of the lift call function across the network and any plans to move to a one-step operation;
- Develop recommendations for the number of lift operators expected to be needed to ensure a high level of service for passengers, minimising unanswered lift calls. This further highlights the necessity for signage to be reviewed, redesigned, and replaced as there is no correct instructional guidance in place for this user group.

No actions to close the above appear to have been taken; although noting the report did result in improved lift-call signage at the lifts (which was found at Navan Road Parkway).

2.6 – Assignment Instructions, Patrol Drivers Specific Instructions, Navan Road Parkway

The assignment instructions set out the open-up procedures for Navan Road Parkway, as follows:

- Park the van outside the main shutter;
- Open the two station entrance shutters;
- Open the gate on the stairs to the platform;
- Check that nobody is on the Platform 1;
- Open the gate on the stairs to the platform;
- Check that nobody is on the Platform 2;
- Exit the building.

In terms of other instances where stations have been locked, there were seven recorded instances of passengers being locked in or out of stations, all involved private contractors.

It should be noted that the RAIU consider that not all incidents are likely recorded and the numbers are likely to be higher. It should also be noted that, at some locations, IÉ carry out the opening of stations.

2.7 – RAIU site visits

In relation to signage in the window of the ticket kiosk which provides a number to phone in the case of emergency. The RAIU phoned this number several times, not one call was answered.

The RAIU used a number of lifts at different locations, and found the following:

- The lift operators did not always speak;
- When lift operators spoke it was “rushed” and in some cases, the instruction could not be heard clearly;
- The RAIU observed a number of customers pressing the lift button and not the lift-call intercom button, many of these passengers left the lift area without using the lift (in the case of vulnerable users, the RAIU assisted these passengers and explained the procedures for calling the lifts for future reference).

Evidence 2.8 – Sequence of events on the 31st January 2025 from 05:36 hrs to 09:16 hrs

05:36 hrs: During the unlocking of Navan Road Parkway Station, for start of service, the Patrol Driver locked the staircase security gate to Platform 2.

06:34 hrs: An adult in a red coat attempts to access Platform 2 via the stairs.

06:35 hrs: Passenger service arrives at Platform 2. No passengers alight or board.

06:37 hrs: The adult in a red coat who attempted to use the staircase to access Platform 2 returns with a second adult dressed in black before both leave the staircase.

06:52 hrs: The adult dressed in black briefly returns to the staircase prior to the arrival of the 06:54 hrs service, before returning to the concourse, using the stairs to Platform 1 and crossing the lines between the platforms to board the service (see Figure 7). The second passenger uses the lift to access Platform 2.



Figure 7 – Passenger alighting onto railway line

07:00 hrs: After the service departs at 06:59 hrs, three passengers attempt to use the stairs, then immediately walk to the Dublin end of Platform 2 and cross the lines, see Figure 8; no attempt to use the lift is made.



Figure 8 – Passengers accessing the railway line from end of Platform 2

07:49 hrs: When the next Down train arrives at the station at 07:45 hrs, two passengers alight from the train. They unsuccessfully attempt to leave via the stairs, then then access the railway line at the platform end without attempting to use the lift, see Figure 9.




Figure 9 – Passengers walking across the tracks

07:51 hrs – 08:00 hrs: The station cleaner accesses the stairs and on finding the gate secured calls to their colleague on the other platform and then returns to the concourse. The cleaner then gains access to Platform 2 via the lift. The lift call intercom is used without any dialogue with the lift operator. After some cleaning on Platform 2 the cleaner again uses the lift call intercom to exit Platform 2, again no dialogue takes place with the lift operator.

08:07 hrs: A train stops at Platform 2. A group of approximately twenty-eight students alight onto Platform 2. The group made their way to the staircase and find the gate secured (between 08:07 hrs and 08:55 hrs, students repeatedly return to the gate in the stairwell in numbers between one and eight persons).

08:08 hrs: Two of the group cross the railway lines between the platforms behind the departing train, see Figure 10 .



Figure 10 – Two students children cross the railway line

08:09 hrs: Part of the group in the stairwell return to Platform 2 and two students press the lift button but not the intercom before stepping away. They then return to the lift and press the intercom button. However, the lift operator fails to answer the call or release the lift. They try the intercom button again before walking away before it is cut-off without being answered. The two students return and make a third attempt which is cut off. A fourth and then fifth attempt is then made, with each call ringing then being terminated.

08:10 hrs: On the sixth attempted call, the call is answered. The student at the intercom says that they are trapped on the platform and that the gate is blocking their exit. Another female student adds (incorrectly) that “someone is stuck in the lift”.

The lift operator, looking at the lift intercom monitor saw that the students were smiling, the security operator also checked the internal lift CCTV and saw that there was no-one in the lift and the lift was operational; as a result, the security operator thought they were “messaging” as there is a high level of anti-social behaviour at Navan Road Parkway Station and did not release the lift for use.

It should be noted that the lift operator for the lifts does not have access to the other station CCTV, from their terminal, which showed the students stuck at the gates on the stairs (it should be noted that the lift operator's terminal does have dual functionality, i.e. access to lift and station CCTV, but this has not been commissioned at terminals for operational reasons). The lift operator did talk to the students (inaudible), following which the student says, "thank you". A voice on the platform is heard to state "someone is coming".

08:11 hrs: A lift-call intercom request was made by a group of three female students on Platform 1. The first call was disconnected, but on the second attempt the lift operator tells the students that the lift is not working.

08:13 hrs - 08:15 hrs: Nineteen students cross the running lines at the end of Platform 2 (see Figure 11). The last of this group cross thirty-four seconds before a non-stop Up train passes.



Figure 11 – Mass track access by students

08:16 hrs: After the passing of a through train a further three students cross the line, see Figure 12.



Figure 12 – Three students crossing the railway lines

08:18 hrs: Two students remaining on Platform 2 return to the lift and debate whether to press the lift-call intercom; they do not press the lift-call intercom but do press the lift button. One of them says that they could use the intercom “to call someone” but is dissuaded from pressing it by the other.

08:22 hrs: TFI contacts the IÉ emergency line and advises the Mainline Regulator of the “school children trapped in the station”. The CCTV was reviewed and groups of students crossing the line were seen. The controlling signalman is advised of the situation.

08:21 hrs: Another train arrives on Platform 1.

08:24 hrs: Three female students, who alighted from the train onto Platform 1, press the lift intercom; the call is then cut off. After a second attempt the lift operator is heard to say “the lift is not working” but this is not heard. A third attempt is made, with the lift operator repeating more loudly the same message which is heard and acknowledged. The station information displays at the time were advising that lifts at Edgeworthstown Platform 2, Clonsilla Platform 2 and Blackrock Platform 2 were out of order, but not Navan Road Parkway.

08:28 hrs: Another train arrives on Platform 2. An adult female alights from the train and proceeds directly to the lift, she presses the lift call intercom button, no dialogue takes place between the female and the lift operator, and the lift is released.

After the lift closes, a male student left on Platform 2, from the previous service, approaches the lift and presses the lift button (not the lift call intercom button) and therefore is unable to use the lift.

08:30 hrs: From approximately 08:30 hrs trains were advised via train radio to approach Navan Road Parkway at extreme caution (i.e. walking pace).

08:32 hrs: A train approaches the station and stops at the platform end where a female student is stood, for approximately thirty seconds. A second person present in the cab speaks to the student (see Figure 13). After the train departs, the female student crosses the lines at the platform end.



Figure 13 – Train stopped, and staff talk to student

08:34 hrs: A student crosses the line between the platforms as the train clears the platform.



Figure 14 – Student crosses railway lines

08:46 hrs: A train arrives on Platform 2. An adult female with a young child and pushchair alight from the train and proceed directly to the lift. The lift-call intercom button is pressed by the child and the lift is enabled without any dialogue.

08:54 hrs: A train arrives on Platform 2. Two adult passengers alight from the train and proceed to the stairs. At the locked gate they converse with a young female and an adult male (which the RAIU believe to be a teacher) who is the other side of the gate (concourse level).

08:55 hrs: The teacher presses the lift-call intercom button from the concourse level for Platform 2 and the lift is enabled without dialogue.

When the lift arrives at ground level, the teacher, admits the two adult passengers and calls to the three students (including the two reluctant to use the lift-call intercom at 08:18 hrs) to enter the lift, holding the doors to allow them to enter. The teacher asks them if there any more students on the platform.

They explain the lift had not been working and the teacher explains that he had just pressed the “emergency button” (he actually the lift-call intercom button).

After the lift has departed to the concourse, a single female student approaches the lift and presses the lift button (not the lift-call intercom button), and she briefly walks away from the lift. On the concourse, the three male students return to the concourse lift and press the lift call intercom button. The lift operator says to “press the lift button” via the intercom. Simultaneously, the female student presses the lift-call intercom button, which cuts off, but the student observes the lift button is activated and presses it. The female student boards the lift and joins the three students.

09:10 hrs: A member of the security team attends site and unlocks the gate.

PART 3 – Analysis & Conclusions

3.1 – Mass access onto railway line

IE were unaware that passengers had accessed onto the line between 06:52 hrs and 08:34 hrs and only became aware on notification by TFI. It is noted that Navan Road Parkway has not been identified as a trespass “hot spot”, however, these trespass incidents were the only the incidents reported, and the numbers may be higher.

3.2 – Lift-call intercom system & lift operators

The lifts on the IE Network require users to press an intercom and the lift button, making it a “two-step” process. The IE Human Factors Department, previously identified customer issues with this process, ranging from users being unable to locate the relevant buttons for the sequence, pressing the wrong buttons or camera instead of the intercom button or not taking any further actions after speaking with the lift operator. The RAIU also found similar issues while observing customers at lifts. The IE Human Factors Department identified that a transition to a one-step process would reduce the time taken to complete each call, reduce the workload of the lift operator, and improve usability for the end users.

There is no training for lift operators to deal with anti-social behaviour and the lift operators have not undergone the CX training, leading to an inconsistent approach for dealing with anti-social behaviour. On the day of the incident, the lift operator erroneously thought the students were not genuine and did not assist them.

3.3 – Station signage and assistance

There was no staff in the room where the emergency number at the ticket kiosk was diverted.

The help points on the platforms are inconspicuous when passengers are at the location of the stairs and lifts (the location where passengers required assistance).

The signage and infrastructure at the platform ramps did not deter students alighting onto the railway lines.

PART 4 – Measures taken by IÉ-RU since the incident

4.1 – Emergency number

When the emergency phone number 090 649 7723 is dialled, it would bring the caller to the CCTV room at Athlone, however, this room is currently unstaffed.

On notification, by the RAIU of the number not being answered, IÉ removed the poster.

All help points are currently managed through the CCTV Room at Mallow. As an interim measure the Telecoms Department have forwarded all calls from the emergency number to the CCTV Control Room at Mallow. A test was carried out to test the diversion and it works as expected. The poster has since been re-installed.

As a result, no further action is required by IÉ, and a safety recommendation is not warranted in terms of emergency number.

4.2 – SOS Point Signage

IÉ-RU are currently trialling new SOS Signage on the Mainline Region (see Figure 15).



Figure 15 – Trail SOS Signage

PART 5 – SAN Safety Recommendations

SAN Publication Date	First published on the 14/05/2025, re-published on the 24/06/2025 with a change in text in Recommendation 1, namely, the addition of the text “being stranded at stations and of people”.
SAN Title	Track access by the public at Navan Road Parkway
SAN Number	SAN 002 (Version 2)
Addressee	IÉ-RU, IÉ-IM & Commission for Railway Regulation
Implementer	IÉ-RU & IÉ-IM
Accident synopsis	In excess thirty-three passengers were unable to exit the Navan Road Parkway Station, after alighting from trains onto Platform 2, and crossed open running lines to do so.
Possible consequences	There was a risk of injuries or fatalities to students from collisions with trains by crossing running lines.
SAN Safety Recommendation 1	<p>IÉ-RU were unaware of intending passengers accessing the railway line in order to access train services. A third party, TFI, first observed the incident and subsequently notified IÉ.</p> <p>In addition, there have been two further incidents of locked stations, at Pelletstown on the 2nd June 2025 and at Navan Road Parkway on the 7th June 2025.</p> <p>As a result, the RAIU make the following safety recommendation:</p> <p>IÉ-RU should review their station monitoring systems (such as CCTV) to see if technologies are available to identify and alert IÉ-RU of incidents of people being stranded at stations and of people accessing the railway lines from station platforms.</p>

SAN Safety

Recommendation 2

When the stairs weren't available, passengers who likely never used the lift, were required to use the lift to exit the station. The current two-step system appears to have impeded their understanding of how to use the lift e.g. users were reluctant to use the intercom call button to seek assistance and some thought it was an emergency button. With no access to the lift, passengers then accessed the line to exit the station.

It is noted that IÉ-RU received funding from the National Transport Authority in 2024, to address real time asset monitoring and improve the remote operation of DART lifts i.e. including upgrade to the one-step process for lifts; additional funding to address the remaining lifts nationwide was not approved in 2025. For the reasons outlined, the RAIU make the following safety recommendation:

IÉ-RU should review the current two-step process for lift call operation to determine whether it is feasible to move to a one-step lift call operation process, on all lifts. Where this is not possible, the Human Factors Department should carry out another review of the lift-call intercom system, with a view to making improvements in terms of the customer experience.

SAN Safety

Recommendation 3

When a student reported that they were stuck on the platform as the gates on the stairs were locked, the lift operator did not have access to the other station CCTV to see that there were passengers gathered at the locked gate, which would have verified the claim. It is noted that the lift operator's terminal has the capability of displaying all station CCTV, but this has not been commissioned for operational reasons. As a result, the RAIU make the following safety recommendation:

IÉ-RU should review the current set-up at HJCC to determine whether it is operationally feasible to provide access to station CCTV for the lift operators and/or develop procedures whereby lift operators can receive and/or report information from/to staff monitoring the CCTV for stations.

SAN Safety

Recommendation 4

When a student reported that they were stuck on the platform as the gates on the stairs were locked, the lift operator thought that the students were “messaging” and did not call for the lift to be released. It is noted that there are no formal procedures for how to identify anti-social behaviour, communicate with passengers. It was also noted that some of the calls to the lift operators went unanswered. As a result, the RAIU make the following safety recommendation:

IE-RU should review the role of the lift operator; this should include the following:

- **Update their training and procedures in terms of positively engaging/ communicating with passengers; and ensuring a consistent approach is adopted across the network;**
- **Update their training and procedures in terms of dealing with anti-social behaviour to include clear guidelines on how to correctly identify anti-social behaviour; and, how to engage and/or communicate with users behaving in an anti-social manner;**
- **Evaluation of human and organisational factors affecting task performance in the role (in particular in terms of workload);**
- **Updating their job description to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities associated with the role;**
- **Update the competence management to reflect the above updates.**

SAN Safety

Recommendation 5

The infrastructure at the end of the platforms was ineffective at deterring passengers from accessing the railway line, as a result, the RAIU make the following safety recommendation:

IE-IM Chief Civil Engineer (CCE) should review current signage located at the platform ramps, with a view to having the signage clearly portray the hazard (i.e. the passenger is accessing a live railway line) and indicates the severity of not adhering to the warning (i.e. possible collision with a train)*.

SAN Safety Recommendation 6	<p>It is noted that the Customer Experience (CX) Manager DART, IÉ-RU and the CCE Regional Manager DART, are currently carrying out risk assessment at stations with high history of trespass occurrences to identify and prioritise locations where anti-trespass mats should be installed†.</p> <p>However, while the <u>reported</u> occurrences of trespass at Navan Road Parkway is low, approximately thirty-three children accessed the railway line without IÉ detecting the incident. As a result, the RAIU make the following safety recommendation:</p> <p>IÉ-IM, in conjunction with IÉ-RU should expand its risk assessment process in terms of prioritising the locations where anti-trespass mats should be fitted, to also consider whether anti-trespass mats should be installed at stations that are in close proximity to schools.</p>
SAN Safety Recommendation 7	<p>The help points on the platforms are inconspicuous to some passengers as the signage was facing directly towards the railway. In relation to this incident, they were inconspicuous to the passengers needing assistance at the lifts and staircase. While noting, that new SOS signage is being trialled, the RAIU consider that a safety recommendation is warranted, to ensure the trialling is progress, as a result the RAIU make the following safety recommendation:</p> <p>IÉ-RU should review and improve its current signage for help points, with a view to improving the visibility of these help points at passenger locations along the platform.</p>
SAN Safety Recommendation 8	<p>The Patrol Driver locked the gates, leaving no instructions at the gate for the customers when they arrived at the gates, as a result, the RAIU make the following safety recommendation:</p> <p>IÉ-RU should consider whether instructional signage is warranted at locations where passengers may become trapped e.g. on gated stairwells, to include emergency numbers and/or details of alternative routes.</p>

* The RAIU note that IÉ-IM made a similar recommendation in their Report of Investigation into the Category 1 near miss with person walking on bridge between Connolly and Tara Street 1st of June 2024 (Issue 1, published 07/02/2025), stating: “The Chief Civil Engineer to examine the feasibility of enhancing the ‘Do Not Trespass on the Railway’ signage with the use of pictograms”.

† The RAIU note that IÉ-IM made this safety action their Report of Investigation into the Category 1 near miss with person walking on bridge between Connolly and Tara Street 1st of June 2024 (Issue 1, published 07/02/2025), stating: “The CX Manger DART, RU and the CCE Regional Manager DART, IM are currently carrying out risk assessments of stations with high history of trespass occurrences to identify and prioritise locations where anti-trespass mats are to be installed”.